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SHOULD THE FEDERAL RESERVE BE
PRESERVED?
There have been three great inventions since the beginning of time.-
fire, the wheel, and central banking. I
The recent United States recession has sparked new cries against
the Federal Reserve System. Congressional critics ranging from con-
servative Republicans2 to liberal Democrats3 have attacked the "Fed,"
and in some cases endorsed its abolition.4 Similarly, prominent econo-
mists and political commentators dramatize severe Federal Reserve
shortcomings.5 Presidents Carter and Reagan have feuded with Fed
Chairmen, while simultaneously shifting responsibility for the econ-
omy's decline to the Federal Reserve.6 While many vehemently attack
the Fed, virtually no one rises to its defense.
I. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, 310 (6th Ed. 1964). Statement by Will Rogers.
2. Ullman, Fed Told To Lower Rates, or Else, The Hartford Courant, Dec. 23, 1982, § 3, at 3,
col. 5. The article cites Representative Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) as a critic "who blames the Fed
for the economy's problems." Additionally, the Fed's congressional critics "run the gamut
from Senate Democratic Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia to conservative Republicans
such as Kemp, [who] contend the Fed's tight-credit policies for fighting inflation have ex-
acted too great a toll on the economy."
3. Margolis, Kennedy Launches "NASA' economics to boost industry, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 6,
1983, § 3, at 10, col. 4. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a speech before the Dem-
ocratic National Committee on February 5, 1983 called for "making the Federal Reserve
Board part of the Treasury Department." In the same address, Kennedy proposed tax re-
form, a 5.7 billion dollar emergency jobs program, and "a NASA for the American econ-
omy," involving joint government-private sector technological development.
4. Id
5. Economist Lester C. Thurow points out:
In most other countries, the nation's central bank is part of the finance ministry and
subject to direct control. If the bank fails in its appointed tasks, it is a failure of the
Administration in power. It cannot blame someone else.
A similar arrangement should be established in the United States. Whatever its
historical merit, the time has come to end the independence of the Fed.
Thurow, Give Reagan the Fed, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1982, at 29. Additionally, the astute
political commentator Theodore White questions:
A President is held responsible by the people for whether they have jobs or not,
whether they eat or not. But can any President accept that responsibility if he does
not have greater authority over the Federal Reserve Board? The board springs from a
seventy-year-old idea for controlling the credit system.
T. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1956-1980, at
427 (1982).
6. The Burns-Carter Not-Quite Fight, TIME, Nov. 7, 1977, at 108. See also Volcker on the Spot,
TIME, Feb. 8, 1982, at 53, which observes:
Like American Presidents going back to Thomas Jefferson during his fight with the
first U.S. national bank, Ronald Reagan is finding it convenient to use the top U.S.
banker as a sort of whipping boy for the public's dismay over an economy that is not
working very well.
The Federal Reserve
CENTRAL BANKING BEFORE THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
An examination of American central banking evolution aids in il-
lustrating operations of the present Federal Reserve System.
The First and Second Banks of the United States seminally influ-
enced today's central banking system. Alexander Hamilton proposed
the First Bank to Congress in 1790.7 Chartered the following year, the
First Bank possessed broad powers to purchase and sell bullion, bills of
exchange, goods pledged in lending, and holdings of public debt.8 The
Bank utilized its position to become America's primary banking voice.
To a young nation still savoring the overthrow of centralized British
financial management, central banking proved intolerable. When the
First Bank's charter expired in 1811, renewal failed because banking
leaders and the general public viewed it as a monopoly.9
Financial hardships arising chiefly during the War of 1812 created
new demands for central banking.' ° The Second Bank of the United
States, established in 1816, appeared virtually indistinguishable from
its earlier incarnation." It also conducted business efficiently, yet
forcefully, and again incurred disfavor. The Second Bank's death knell
rang during the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Appealing to the same
fears and political pressures which destroyed the First Bank, Jackson
ceaselessly worked against its successor until its 1836 dissolution.
12
State banks and the United States Treasury partially assumed the
national banks' functions.' 3 The American Civil War's huge expenses
caused grave financial strain, catalyzing the National Currency Act of
1863.14 This Act placed great responsibility upon the Comptroller of
the Currency to restrict and supervise loans in order to guide business
growth. The system failed chiefly because its powers were tailored to
respond to Civil War financial hardships, and not to gauge long-term
issues. Small banks lost flexibility because they had to place large per-
centages of their reserves in central banks. National bank notes did not
7. B. BECKHART, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, at 4 (1972). Alexander Hamilton served as the
first Treasury Secretary of the United States. The philosophical feud between Thomas Jef-
ferson and Hamilton remains not widely known, yet its ramifications have great importance.
Thomas Jefferson envisioned a future America of rural farmlands, while Hamilton correctly
predicted a mass-scale urban and industrial environment.
8. Id. at6.
9. Id at8.
10. Id. at 8-9.
11. Id. at 9. The Act of April 10, 1816, most notably provided that of the Bank's 25 directors,
shareholders elected 20, while the President would appoint the remaining five. Under the
old charter, shareholders elected all directors.
12. Id at 13. Jackson hyperbolically proclaimed about the Second Bank that "[aill of its opera-
tions within would be in aid of the hostile armies and fleets without." A markedly different
evaluation of the Bank came from President Woodrow Wilson, who wrote that it "had not
only served its purpose as a fiscal agent of the government to the satisfaction of the Treasury,
but had also steadied and facilitated every legitimate business transaction and rid the money
market of its worst dangers." Id at 13, which quotes 4 W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, at 47 (1906).
13. Id at 13-16.
14. Id. at 17.
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adequately respond to demands for currency because they were tied to
United States debts which steadily declined after the Civil War.'5
The banking systems succeeding the First and Second National
Banks could neither adequately plan around the economy's cycles, nor
address monetary shortcomings. When the public demanded gold or
currency from banks, cash drains inevitably developed. When banks
called in loans and liquidated other assets to meet this demand, eco-
nomic contraction commenced, investment faltered, and production
declined.' 6
The impact of monetary laissez-faire policy climaxed in the "Rich
Man's Panic" of 1907. In that year, the Knickerbocker Trust Company
failed to meet withdrawal demands, thereby precipitating a severe
stock exchange decline which ultimately resulted in extensive bank
business closings;' 7 only the financial support of private financiers,
most notably J.P. Morgan,' 8 stemmed total monetary collapse.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The Federal Government's inability to anticipate or respond to
banking crises led to a congressional consensus for a central apparatus
to guide monetary matters.' 9 Nevertheless, six years passed from the
Panic of 1907 to the creation of central banking.
Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913.
The Act's preamble provided for "the establishment of Federal reserve
banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting
commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking
in the United States and for other purposes. ' 2' The Act which emerged
steered between creating a powerful, singular monetary authority, and
merely providing an overseeing consultative group. Specifically, the
15. Id at 21-23.
16. See G. BACH, FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY-MAKING, at 3 (1950).
17. E. GROSECLOSE, FIFTY YEARS OF MANAGED MONEY, at 30 (1965).
The windows rang down, and the Knickerbocker Trust Company was in insolvency
with $52 million of liabilities.
Panic now spread in Wall Street, throughout the nation. On the Stock Exchange
call money went to 70 per cent and quotations tumbled. The ticker brought news
from Pittsburgh of the triple failure of the great Westinghouse interests--the Westing-
house Electric and Manufacturing Co., the Westinghouse Machine Co., and the Se-
curities Investment Co., along with the closing of the Pittsburgh stock exchange. As
the day wore on reports came in of bank closings and business failures throughout the
land. Like fire leaping a break strip, a run started on the Trust Company of America,
and by closing time the bank had been drained of $13 million.
The country was now in the cold grip of crisis.
18. Id at 34.
The panic may have been precipitated by financial manipulators, but they assumed
the responsibility and leadership for arresting its spread and restoring stability. There
was no hesitancy. And among them all, authorities agree that [J.P.] Morgan was
chief. Abroad, his leadership was universally acknowledged, while French editorials
caustically commented on [Theodore] Roosevelt's hunting trip during the crisis.
19. G. BACH, supra note 16, at 5.
20. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Federal Reserve Act].
The Federal Reserve
Act provided for up to twelve Federal Reserve cities,2' each endowed
with corporate powers and guided by its own directors. 22 The System's
central guidance originated from the seven member Federal Reserve
Board, comprised of the Treasury Secretary, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and five "Governors" appointed by the President of the
United States and confirmed by the Senate. The five appointees each
held ten year staggered terms, with one member nominated as Chair-
man by the President.23
The Act empowered the Federal Reserve to regulate banks rather
than to establish monetary policy. 24 Initially the Fed provided neces-
sary monetary coordination without amassing the flagrant power which
ruined the First and Second Banks of the United States.
Ingrained distrust of centralized banking led Congress to set param-
eters for the Federal Reserve allowing each Reserve bank to buy and
sell gold coin, bullion, specified United States bonds, notes, and com-
mercial paper from member banks. Furthermore, Congress empow-
ered the banks to establish rates of discount for paper subject to the
Board's control, and to establish certain accounts; 25 however, Congress
did not allow the Fed to independently set rates on government securi-
21. Federal Reserve Act, § 2. The act called for "not less than eight nor more than twelve cities
to be known as Federal Reserve cities, and shall divide the continental United States, exclud-
ing Alaska, into districts, each district to contain only one of such Federal Reserve cities."
Amidst much politicking, the 12 chosen cities were Minneapolis, San Francisco, Kansas City,
Dallas, St. Louis, Cleveland, Chicago, Atlanta, Richmond, Philadelphia, Boston and New
York. The cities remain as the present district seats. For a glimpse of the attempts by U.S.
cities to procure the status of a "reserve city," see W. HARDING, THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, at 34-38 (1925). See also E. GROSECLOSE, supra note 17, at
90.
22. Federal Reserve Act, § 4.
23. Federal Reserve Act, § 10.
A Federal Reserve Board is hereby created which shall consist of seven members,
including the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, who
shall be members ex officio, and five members appointed by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In selecting the five
appointive members of the Federal Reserve Board, not more than one of whom shall
be selected from any one Federal reserve district, the President shall have due regard
to a fair representation of the different commercial, industrial and geographical divi-
sions of the country.
24. Federal Reserve Act, § 11. This section authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to examine
accounts and demand statements from Reserve banks. The Board also received powers to
suspend Reserve requirements and require Reserve banks to rediscount discounted paper of
other Reserve banks. The act also permitted the hiring of all employees "deemed necessary
to conduct the business of the Board."
Section II additionally grants the Federal Reserve Board the following powers and func-
tions: (I) supervising and regulating the issuing and retirement of Federal Reserve notes;
(2) adding to or reclassifying reserve cities; (3) suspending or removing a Federal Reserve
bank officer; (4) requiring the writing off of worthless or doubtful assets in Reserve bank
balance sheets; (5) suspending operations of a Reserve bank for violating Federal Reserve
Act provisions; (6) making regulations for safeguarding property in the hands of Federal
Reserve agents; and (7) granting national banks special power to act as an executor, trustee,
administrator or registrar of stocks.
Section 1 1(j) grants the Federal Reserve Board authority "[t]o exercise general supervi-
sion over said Federal Reserve banks."
25. Federal Reserve Act, § 14 a-e.
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ties." Additionally, Congress required each Reserve bank to maintain
large reserves in gold or currency against its deposits or notes in
circulation.27
Although the Federal Reserve System initially relied mainly upon
its discounting powers, the Federal Reserve subtly, yet markedly in-
creased its monetary influence in 1922.28 To moderate the economy,
the Fed began relying more heavily on its open market operations than
on shifting the discount rate.29 Open market operations focused on
withdrawing or infusing credit into the economy by buying or selling
paper. Easy credit availability in theory encourages businesses to ex-
pand operations, in turn providing new jobs and a greater market for
sales.3° Tightened credit works toward restraining inflation by control-
ling spending.3' In open market adjustments, the Fed could thus influ-
ence the economy's expansion or contraction.
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic tail-
spin32 promoted the next great strengthening of Federal Reserve Sys-
tem powers. Although some commentators suggest that Federal
26. A Veiled Assault on the Fed, Bus. WEEK, June 14, 1982, at 127.
27. Federal Reserve Act, § 16.
28. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE PORTFOLIO, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-
82 (1966).
29. E. GROSECLOSE, supra note 17, at 131.
30. See, SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 310.
If business is getting worse and jobs are getting scarce, the Federal Reserve Board will
try to expand money and credit. But if spending threatens to become excessive, so
that prices are rising and there are many job vacancies, then the Federal Reserve
authorities . . . will do all that is possible to step on the brakes and contract money
and credit.
31. Id
32. On October 24, 1929, a date known as "Black Thursday," various economic forces
culminated in the stock market crash. The Great Depression, the longest worldwide period
of high unemployment and low business activity, resulted when stock values dropped rap-
idly. On black thursday, almost 13 million shares of stock were sold, and the crash started a
downward movement in stock prices that continued for two years.
Prior to the crash, industrial societies enjoyed prosperous growth but ignored warnings
that the economy was awry. In 1928, the residential construction industry slumped and busi-
ness expenditures for capital improvements were declining. During July, August, and Sep-
tember, the stock market hit daily highs. On September 7, 1929, a reaction began and
culminated in the crash of October 24.
The Great Depression was five times longer and harsher than any other depression exper-
ienced by the United States. From October, 1929, until Franklin D. Roosevelt became Presi-
dent in March, 1933, the economy slumped almost every month. From 1930 to 1933, prices
of industrial stocks fell eighty percent. Bank failures increased as the depression continued;
about 1350 banks failed during 1930 and another 2300 banks failed during 1932. These bank
failures resulted in less money for industrial loans and consequently a drop in production
and rise in unemployment.
From 1929 to 1933, the total value of goods and services produced annually in the United
States fell from about $104 billion to about $56 billion. In 1925, about three percent of the
nations' workers were unemployed. The unemployment rate reached about nine percent in
1930 and about 25%, or about 13 million persons, in 1933. In 1932, at least 25,000 families
and more than 200,000 young people wandered through the country seeking food, clothing,
shelter, and jobs.
It was not until Roosevelt took office in 1932 that the Federal Government intervened
with New Deal legislation and relieved the devastation of the Great Depression. The depres-
sion ended in 1942, after the country entered World War 11.
See generally, S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 940-947
(1965); D. WECTER, THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 12-33 (1948).
[Vol. 11:148
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Reserve policies themselves contributed to the crash,33 President
Franklin Roosevelt and Congress vigorously reinforced the Federal
Reserve System. Through the Banking Acts of 19333' and 1935,'3 Con-
gress built a banking structure that has since been characterized as a
distinct federal governmental branch.36
The most notable achievement of the Banking Act of 1933 lay in its
formal creation of a Federal Open Market Committee, comprised of
one member for each Federal Reserve District.37  The Open Market
Committee became the formal apparatus for controlling growth
through buying and selling securities. 38  The Banking Act centralized
33. M. LARSON, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND OUR MANIPULATED DOLLAR, at leaf (1975). The
author rhetorically asks the reader a series of economic questions, such as, "DID YOU
KNOW. . .That the Fed caused the panic of 1920-21, the stock market explosion of 1926-
29, and the great collapse of 1929?" For more "questioning" of the Fed, see infra note 65.
34. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Banking Act of 1933].
35. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 1, 49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Banking Act of 19351.
36. Supreme Court ofAMoney, TIME, July 17, 1978, at 67.
The Constitution divided the Government into three branches, but now there are re-
ally 3 /-with the Federal Reserve System being the half. It has so much latitude in
money and banking that it is equal in independence to the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches.
37. Banking Act of 1933, § 8.
The Federal Reserve Act, as amended, is amended by inserting between sections
12 and 13 (U.S.C., title 12, secs. 261, 262, and 342), thereof the following new sections:
Sec. 12A.(a) There is hereby created a Federal Open Market Committee [herein-
after referred to as the 'committee'), which shall consist of as many members as there
are Federal reserve districts. Each Federal reserve bank by its board of directors shall
annually select one member of said committee. The meetings of said committee shall
be held at Washington, District of Columbia, at least four times each year, upon the
call of the governor of the Federal Reserve Board or at the request of any three mem-
bers of the committee, and, in the discretion of the Board, may be attended by the
members of the Board.
(b) No Federal reserve bank shall engage in open-market operations under sec-
tion 14 of this Act except in accordance with regulations adopted by the Federal Re-
serve Board. The Board shall consider, adopt, and transmit to the committee and to
the several Federal reserve banks regulations relating to the open-market transactions
of such banks and the relations of the Federal Reserve System with foreign central or
other foreign banks.
(c) The time, character, and volume of all purchases and sales of paper described
in section 14 of this Act as eligible for open-market operations shall be governed with
a view to accommodating commerce and business and with regard to their bearing
upon the general credit situation of the country.
(d) If any Federal reserve bank shall decide not to participate in open-market
operations recommended and approved as provided in paragraph (b) hereof, it shall
file with the chairman of the committee within thirty days a notice of its decision, and
transmit a copy thereof to the Federal Reserve Board.
38. See, SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 314.
To see how an open-market operation changes Reserves, let us suppose that the Fed
thinks the economic winds are blowing up a little inflation. Its Open Market Commit-
tee holds the usual secret meeting. They say: "Let's sell I billion dollars of govern-
ment bonds from our portfolio to contract Reserves and over-all credit." The motion
is unanimously carried. To whom are the bonds sold? No one knows: to the open
market. The dealers in government bonds--there are about half a dozen big ones-
will not reveal the names of the buyers. But you can guess that they are primarily
insurance companies, commercial banks, and big business firms.
The buyer will most likely pay for the bonds by a check to the Fed drawn on his
bank account. The Fed will present this check for payment to his member bank. The
member bank will lose an equivalent amount of its Reserve balances with the Federal
Journal of Legislation
banking by proscribing the independence of the Federal Reserve Dis-
trict Governors.39
The Federal Reserve Board now possessed the means to control
monetary policy more directly. The Federal Open Market Committee
became the chief device to effectively influence monetary policy, and it
largely co-opted the power held by Federal Reserve Districts, thus en-
suring "unified monetarism." The Banking System had evolved to a
stage where it possessed political insulation and powers exceeding that
of the Banks of the United States.
The Banking Act of 1935 fortified the Fed's independence. The
Treasury Department no longer could exert direct influence over the
Fed.4" In this manner, the Federal Reserve completely severed links to
the executive branch. The Fed's relationship with the President be-
came dictated more by cooperation and compromise than partial con-
trol from above. A system of checks and balances had emerged.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM TODAY
Although the Fed possesses chief authority over monetary matters,
it does not wield unlimited power. The President and Senate designate
new Federal Reserve Governors, and the President chooses the Chair-
man and Vice-Chairman. The Board must report to Congress on its
policies, and must function within the framework of governmental pol-
icies." Despite several constraints placed on the Federal Reserve, it
maintains a strong independence and has an impressive bureaucracy to
support it. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Open
Market Committee, and Reserve Banks implement policies for the Sys-
tem's roughly 5,500 member banks.
4 2
Reserve. . . . The open-market sale has cut down on the Fed's assets and liabilities.
(It has also initially cut down on member bank Reserves and their demand deposits
owned to the bond buyer.)
39. See G. BACH, supra note 16, at 14. Perhaps this shift of power from the separate Reserve
banks to the Central Board of Governors naturally concluded from America's own centrally
controlled decision making, vis-a-vis the Federal Government and the 50 states. In this light,
the 1913 Federal Reserve Act resembles the Articles of Confederation, while the Banking
Acts passed in the 1930's, appears more like the Constitution. See also, Does it Matter "ho's
Head ofthe Fed?, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1978, at 64.
40. Banking Act of 1935, § 203 b.
The first two paragraphs of section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, are
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 10. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Board') shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, after the date of
enactment of the Banking Act of 1935, for terms of fourteen years except as hereinaf-
ter provided, but each appointive member of the Federal Reserve Board in office on
such date shall continue to serve as a member of the Board until February 1, 1936,
and the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency shall continue
to serve as members of the Board until February 1, 1936."
41. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM-PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, at 3,
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL].
42. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 69TH ANNUAL REPORT, at 233 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
RESERVE REPORT]. The Federal Reserve's Annual Report listed 5,538 insured commercial
member banks as of June 30, 1981. Of these banks, 4,506 were national banks, while the
[Vol. 11: 148
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The Board of Governors formulates policy, supervises and regulates
banks, comprises the majority of the Open Market Committee,and es-
tablishes reserve and discount requirements for members. 43 The Fed-
eral Open Market Committee determines what transactions the Fed
will enter into in the free market.44 Each of the twelve Federal Reserve
banks makes loans to member banks and earns money from interest on
securities in open market operations. Additionally, each branch direc-
tor establishes interest rates on short-term collateral loans.45
The Fed forms monetary policy primarily by coordinating open
market operations, changing member banks' reserve requirements and
regulating member banks' discounting with Federal Reserve banks.46
In the open market, the Fed purchases and sells primarily government
securities.4 7 By buying securities, the availability of bank reserve funds
increases, thereby creating economic expansion.48
Under the 1935 Act and its amendments, the Board of Governors
may set reserve ratios which member banks must hold against time and
demand deposits.49 Increasing reserve requirements restricts economic
growth, while decreasing the ratio promotes expansion.5 0 In its dis-
counting operations, the Fed exerts control over monetary growth.
Through the Fed's discount window, member banks may borrow to
meet money shortages resulting from aggressive lending. By adjusting
the discount rate to members, the Fed can control the amount and
profitability of borrowing.5
In addition to its policy-making functions, the Federal Reserve sys-
tem supervises and regulates member banks. For instance, the Federal
Reserve Chairman may publish rules delineating bank behavior. 2 Ad-
ditionally, the Fed prevents bank monpolies and other restraints of
trade.53
remainder were state banks. On June 30, 1981, there were also 8,876 non-member insured
commercial banks. However, at this period, the member banks held $149,397,441m in total
cash assets, as compared to $38,905,688m in total cash assets held by non-member banks.
"Member banks" are those corporations choosing to keep certain reserves with the Fed, in
exchange for loans and other banking privileges. See generally PETER MERRILL ASSOCIATES,
INC., THE FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBERSHIP PROBLEM: IMPACT ON BANKS (1979).
43. FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41, at 13-14.
44. R. KNIGHT, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE BANKING
SYSTEM, at 1-2 (1969).
45. FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41, at 17.
46. Id at 49.
47. P. DEROSA AND G. STERN, IN THE NAME OF MONEY, at 37 (1981). "The overwhelming
majority of open market operations involve either Treasury securities, government agency
issues, or bankers acceptances .
48. Id.
49. FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41, at 78.
50. Id at 79.
51. G. McKINNEY, JR., THE FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW, at 6-7 (1960). "As a cost
factor, it has some influence on the level of member bank borrowing (just how much influ-
ence is a matter of conjecture). More important, however, is its effect as a signal to the
financial community."
52. FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41, at 107-8.
53. Id at 115.
1984]
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The Federal Reserve System influences international banking. The
Board of Governors appraises current world situations in formulating
United States policy, and engages in foreign exchange transactions
within its authority.54 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York handles
reserve transactions with the central banks of foreign nations." More
importantly, the Fed regulates and supervises both American banks'
foreign operations and non-American banks' activities within the
United States.56 The Board of Governors gauges its member banks'
activities closely; the Fed issues licenses, regulates banking, and autho-
rizes foreign investments.57 Thus, although the Federal Reserve pri-
marily deals with United States monetary policy, it possesses
mechanisms which can shape international banking. By exercising its
powers, the Fed helps ensure that international banking does not
thwart American objectives.
CRITICISMS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
While Congress delineates Federal Reserve functions, powers, and
tools, these lawmakers encounter problems in monitoring their crea-
tion.5" The Fed is a legislative progeny, yet not part of either the legis-
lative or executive branch. Friction arises when the Board of
Governors acts contrary to real or perceived aims of Congress or the
President.
A certain envy of the Fed's insulation from political accountability
accompanies the frustration elected officials feel when dealing with this
independent entity.59 Federal Reserve Board Governors, like Supreme
Court Justices, face no elections after their nominations and approvals.
With little use for press coverage, the Fed can effectively remove itself
from media scrutiny. Only the President and Congress must account to
the public during periods of economic stagnation. Consequently, legis-
lators use the Federal Reserve as a scapegoat to defend their own
records at election time.
Elected officials often feel frustrated when Federal Reserve policies
alter congressional bills6 or presidential goals. For instance, President
Reagan became frustrated when, after his congressional budget suc-
cesses, the Fed refused to lower interest rates. 61 Thus, the Federal Re-
54. P. DEROSA AND G. STERN, supra note 47, at 136-40.
55. Id at 134. The writers explain the operating procedure as, "[wihen the Federal Reserve
intervenes in the foreign exchange markets, its trading desk at the New York Bank actually
executes orders with dealers in New York."
56. FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41, at 92.
57. Id at 116.
58. M. NEWTON, THE FED, at 91-107 (1983). The author cites Robert Weintraub's study "out-
lin[ing] the steps taken over the years to make the Federal Reserve answerable to Congress."
The author argues that Congress has largely failed in this pursuit.
59. A. CLIFFORD, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 392-99 (1965).
60. Id, at 333-38 (1965).
61. An Interview With the President, FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1981, at 70, col. 3. The following inter-
view took place between President Reagan and Hedley Donovan:
Reagan: "I think what Don [Regan] was saying was that we can have and should
[Vol. 11:148
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serve Board is perceived as stubborn and inflexibile.62
Congressional defenders of executive planning have led the charge
against the Fed's seemingly impregnable bastion controlling American
monetary affairs.63 Lawmakers, perhaps understandably, argue that no
non-elected body should deter implementation of elected leaders' na-
tional programs. From this perspective, the Federal Reserve System is
"undemocratic."
PROPOSALS TO LIMIT FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM POWERS
A plethora of proposals to circumscribe the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem's powers emerged in recent years from diverse sources. Extreme
liberal' and conservative 65 spokesman have called for abolishing the
Federal Reserve System. One plan advocates shifting Fed powers to
have some loosening of interest rates because they're now contributing to
the inflation we're trying to cure."
Donovan: "Are you going to say that yourself?"
Reagan: "Yes, I'm willing to say it. But we can't dictate to the Fed."
62. See, Volcker on the Spot, supra note 6.
63. Ullman, supra note 2, § 3, at 3, col. 6. "Since the summer, Fed officials have slowed the
congressional drive to limit the bank's independence by easing up its grip on credit to allow
interest rates to come down."
64. See, Margolis, supra note 3.
65. One such spokesman is Martin Larson. See M. LARSON, supra note 33. The author bases his
anti-Fed position on a belief that the System has been allotted too much power and has
never wielded that influence wisely. In support of his thesis, Larson asks rhetorically
whether the reader knows:
(1) That the Federal Reserve Act was concocted by a group of bankers and poli-
ticians at a secret meeting on Jekyll Island in 1911?
(2) That it established a government-sponsored but private banking system
which controls interest and credit, issues our money, and therefore controls our econ-
omy?
(3) That in passing this Act, Congress surrendered one of its most vital constitu-
tional mandates to a consortium of private financiers and thereby created an all-pow-
erful fourth division in the federal government?
(4) That Woodrow Wilson was financed by the very financiers against whom he
conducted a public crusade during his campaign for the presidency in 1912?
(5) That the Fed was "sold" to the American people as a permanent safeguard
against depression, panics, inflation, and deflation; but that Charles A. Lindbergh,
father of the Lone Eagle, correctly foretold that the Fed would create panics and
depressions "scientifically"?
(6) That both world wars-which made hundreds of billions for the financiers-
could not have been financed without the Fed?
(7) That the Fed caused the panic of 1920-21, the stock market explosion of
1926-29, and the great collapse of 1929?
(8) That it caused the terrible depression to continue for ten years in order to
liquidate the people and condition them for war?
(9) That the Fed can cause the stock market to go up or down by rigging interest
rates and by buying bonds through its Open Market Committee?
(10) That the member banks of the Fed obtain government bonds for nothing
and use them to lend up to ten times their value at high interest on good collateral?
(11) That foreign bankers now own about 18,000 tons of formerly American gold
which, purchased at $35.00 an ounce, will yield them a profit of perhaps $100 billion,
all tax-free?
(12) That the fiat money now being issued by the Fed is unconstitutional and
could become as worthless as the continentals?
Id, at leaf.
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the Treasury Department. 66 Supporters of this plan argue that by dele-
gating these duties to an executive bureau, the President would have to
answer for the Administration's economic performance. One political
analyst has suggested that the Fed hamstrings the President in carrying
out his elected responsibilities.67
Advocates of dissolving the Fed ignore very fundamental dynamics
of government. If the executive branch absorbs the Fed, a President
can merely shift the blame for current economic malaise to Congress or
past Administrations. Additionally, endowing a President with com-
plete monetary control vastly expands the executive branch bureau-
cracy. Given what has at times been dubbed an "imperial
presidency, ' 68 shifting the Fed's machinery could have staggering im-
plications for the balance of power; monetary dominance and fiscal
veto could virtually supplant Congress' budgetary functions.
Many suggestions short of eliminating the Federal Reserve System
have also emerged. In 1977, Paul Volcker, then President of the New
York Federal Reserve Bank, cited the following legislative proposals to
change the nation's monetary structure: (1) Congress should control
appropriations to the Fed, (2) Congress should subject the Fed to more
audits, or (3) Congress should reduce the Governors' terms.69 These
measures strip the Federal Reserve of its present policy-making influ-
ence.7" Removing essential powers in this manner renders the Fed's
independence a myth.
Politicizing the Fed stands as the major drawback to proposals plac-
ing reins on the System's independence. With new congressional con-
straints, the Board of Governors would have to exert greater pressure
when lobbying their monetary programs. The Board would necessarily
shift from striving to produce the best ideas to trying not to offend
lawmakers. Arguably these developments could engender a more dem-
ocratic atmosphere in banking; however, this argument obscures the
significant powers that elected officials wield over the Federal Re-
serve.7 Additionally, as a "creature of Congress," the Fed has a solid
popular foundation; banking crises and depressions have taught na-
tional leaders the necessity of placing a strong, separate, and self-suffi-
cient entity in charge of national banking.
The historical development of the current banking system indicates
that banking panics and collapses arose in the absence of central gui-
dance. For instance, Theodore Roosevelt's otherwise capable adminis-
66. See, Thurow, supra note 5.
67. Id
68. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). The author, writing during the
Nixon Administration, feared that the Presidency was becoming too powerful for democratic
well being. This perceived threat eased after President Richard Nixon's resignation and the
subsequent congressional rise, yet the spectre of imperial presidency may never disappear.
69. Remarks Before the New York State Bankers Association, 49 N.Y. STATE BAR JOURNAL § 25
(1977).
70. Id
71. See FEDERAL RESERVE MANUAL, supra note 41.
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tration could not contain the Panic of 1907.72 After the Panic, the
compromise Federal Reserve System which emerged held limited mon-
etary powers and operated under executive supervision.73 This ar-
rangement somewhat parallels contemporary suggestions seeking to
minimize, rather than entirely destroy the Fed. Both the modem pro-
posals and the pre-Depression model seek to prevent the Fed from un-
wisely and uncontrollably pursuing monetary policies.
The major drawback of returning the Fed to its pre-New Deal posi-
tion lies in re-establishing an entity proven incapable of containing
post-Stock Market Crash "fallout." If a quasi-independent Fed failed
in preventing the economic depression of the 1930's, why should one
suppose it will be anymore successful today? Although Congress cre-
ated supplementary New Deal programs such as the FDIC and the So-
cial Security Administration to promote economic stability, greater
governmental bureaucratization and private sector sophistication place
new strains on economic planning. Indeed, many commentators praise
the Board of Governors for staving off monetary collapse in the wake
of the present recession.74 Weak central control and planning provide
the most inflammable fuel for igniting economic conflagration.
The current Federal Reserve System has performed as a strong
steward over United States banking. The Fed has in large part pre-
vented previously experienced banking scares by utilizing its vast array
of tools. Unlike the President or Congress, the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors pays detailed attention solely to the nation's monetary
matters; it can predict and prevent, as well as react and respond to
crises.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM
Although the Federal Reserve System presently does not require
major overhauls, it should not remain impervious to change. Vice
72. See GROSECLOSE, supra note 17.
73. See Federal Reserve Act, supra notes 23, 24 and accompanying text. See also Supreme Court
of Money, supra note 36: "This independence and geographical dispersion were exactly
what Congress had in mind when, spearheaded by Virginia Senator Carter Glass, it created
the Federal Reserve after a fight in 1913 between easy-money Westerners and hard-money
Easterners .. "
74. See Bringing Inflation Under Control, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 41, col. 1 and 2. In TIME'S "Man
of the Year" issue, Fed Chief Volcker was named (along with British Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and E.T.) as a runnerup to
"Machine of the Year," the Computer. TIME praised his job dedication, stating, "[a]lthough
the Reagan Administration has been vocally committed to bringing inflation under control,
waging this fight has fallen pretty much to Volcker, a 1979 appointee of Jimmy Carter's
.... As the economic slump that began in 1981 deepened during 1982, Volcker had to
perform a delicate balancing act."
See also Volcker Departure Expected, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1983, at 2, col. 2. The
Tribune reports, "[olne thing that apparently angered white House officials was a story in
the Wall Street Journal suggesting it was Volcker who saved the world economic system
during the recent banking crisis, while the Reagan administration sat on its thumbs."
See generally Second Term for Paul Volcker, THE ECONOMIST, March 19, 1983, at 14-15.
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President George Bush currently heads a commission to study financial
regulatory agencies, and to make recommendations for legislative
amendments.75 While this commission may not have reached any con-
clusions yet, it should consider the following suggestions for altering
the Federal Reserve System. These proposals offer ways for the Fed to
evolve without sacrificing its efficiency and influence.
Rather than paring the Federal Reserve System, Congress and the
President should explore methods to ensure greater coordination be-
tween short-term and long-term economic policy. A possible fruitful
area for cooperation is controlling the escalation of outstanding loans
("the debt bomb")" which American banks extend to third world
countries. In its 1982 Annual Report to Congress, the Fed estimated
that United States chartered banks had increased outstanding loans to
developing nations from approximately fifty billion dollars at the end
of 1978, to about $105 billion in September, 1982.77 If American banks
called in their loans, several debtor countries would default, perhaps
precipitating international banking collapse. Meanwhile, banks must
provide new loans to ensure debtors' solvency. 8
The Federal Reserve system is probably the sole institution which
could meet such an international monetary crisis.7 9 Ramifications of
such an event would severely damage relations between the United
States and the defaulting nations, causing domestic monetary
shortages. Given their current responsibilities, Congress and the Presi-
dent also would have to address such an event.
To prepare for and monitor crises touching the Fed and all
branches of government, greater policy coordination must commence.
The most constructive change could arise by aligning the Fed's mone-
tary policymaking with the goals of elected officials. Although the Fed-
eral Reserve System should remain independent, it must establish
better contacts with other policy sources. In this manner, the Fed could
learn more about executive and legislative aims and means, while ad-
vancing its own viewpoint.
Congress could best effect greater policy coordination by establish-
ing ad hoc committees to defuse a crisis such as "the debt bomb."
Three persons chosen by the President, the Congress, and the Federal
75. Letter from Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs to author (May 31, 1983). The Commission which Vice Presi-
dent Bush currently chairs is named "Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services."
[letter on file at the JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION office].
76. The Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42-51. The cover story begins by paraphras-
ing Winston Churchill, "[niever in history have so many nations owed so much money with
so little promise of repayment."
77. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 42, at 25. The report states that "about half [of the
total debt] was accounted for by Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil."
78. See generally The Debt Bomb Threat, supra note 76, at 42-45.
79. Id. at 44. "Since U.S. banks have the biggest overseas commitment and more than three-
quarters of international loans are made in dollars, there is little doubt in financial circles




Reserve Chairman would comprise each committee. The President
would appoint the committee chairman, subject to approval from the
Senate and the Fed's Board of Governors. Though committee recom-
mendations need not bind any institution, the products of such a pro-
cess could not easily be ignored.
Ad hoc committees would solve long-term problems involving
banking, lawmaking, and shaping foreign affairs. The committees
could originate before an issue becomes a crisis, and continue until
they propose a stable and farsighted solution. For example, a commit-
tee might form now to defuse "the debt bomb" and develop contin-
gency plans to stabilize banking and governmental circles. The
committee would continue to operate until a majority of its members
decided to end deliberations. In this manner, participants ensure that
they have successfully met their objectives. If the group did not dis-
solve after a reasonable period, Congress could cut off funding and re-
move its designated representatives from the panel.
The ad hoc committee concept might extend to concerns beyond
overlending to third world governments: unemployment, bank restruc-
turing, and productivity issues require extensive policy consideration.
Policy coordination is key.
Before the Fed, the President, and Congress embark on separate
long-range policy formulation, they should gain insight into each
other's plans, which stem from diverse concerns, ends, and means. In-
creased discussion would also produce better solutions, as the various
perspectives combine to form the larger picture of policy formation.
The Federal Reserve System can deflect criticism from elected officials
by directly joining in planning. The Fed would maintain its indepen-
dence, while not appearing unresponsive to any other decision maker.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve System is not a static and unchangeable entity,
but one which Congress may mold to respond to advancing technology
and complexity. 0 Congress must balance its desire to have modern
issues met decisively by the Fed against its fear of unwittingly develop-
ing a new governmental branch. The ad hoc committee approach per-
mits the Fed to voice its expertise in policy making discussions, without
80. P. WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH, 5 and 7 (1930).
Paul M. Warburg, an original Federal Reserve Governor, muses:
Fortunately, in a world of constant evolution, public opinion advances and, as time
loosens the strangle hold of prejudices and party commitments, the 'political necessi-
ties' of yesterday cease to exercise their sway. Ever-changing economic and psycho-
logical conditions call for the adaptation of old laws to new circumstances; and
defects in a law which had to be accepted as the price of its enactment may subse-
quently be corrected with comparative ease. . . . Finally, the Reserve System does
not stand still. Its problems are immediate, and legislative action may be invoked at
any time. When the hour for action by Congress does arrive, it is of the utmost im-




necessarily increasing its powers. The Fed's independence would not
diminish, yet its perceived isolation might evaporate. In seeking to ren-
ovate the Federal Reserve to address changing needs, legislators must
remember that change does not necessarily usher in diminution or
growth of influence.
Donald J Hubbard*
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